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EVIDENCE
RICHARD A. GONZALES* AND SUSAN WECKESSER**
I. INTRODUCTION
The Survey year produced a number of significant developments in the
law of evidence in New Mexico. The supreme court adopted two new
rules: Rule 514 creating a qualified news media privilege and Rule 707
governing the admissibility of polygraph evidence. Moreover, decisions
of the supreme court and court of appeals addressed a variety of relevancy,
privilege, scientific evidence, and hearsay issues. Those cases thought to
have the most immediate impact on the trial process are treated in this
Survey.
II. ADMISSIBILITY OF DEFENDANT'S REFUSAL
TO SUBMIT TO CHEMICAL TEST
In McKay v. Davis,1 the supreme court held that the prosecution in a
drunk driving case may offer evidence that the defendant refused to take
a breath-alcohol test. The defendant had challenged the admission of such
evidence on three grounds: (1) that the New Mexico Implied Consent
Act' creates a right to refuse to submit to such a test and evidence of
such refusal, therefore, is inadmissible at trial; (2) that admission of the
defendant's refusal violated his federal fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination; and (3) that evidence of the defendant's refusal is
irrelevant to the question of his sobriety.
The supreme court specifically held that the Implied Consent Act did
not give drivers the right to refuse to take a breath test. Instead, in the
court's view, the statute simply precludes the forcible administration of
chemical tests against a driver's will. 3 The court declined to characterize
*Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law; B.A., University of New Mexico;
J.D., New York University.
**J.D., University of New Mexico School of Law, 1983; associated with Patrick A. Casey, P.A.,
Santa Fe, NM.
1. 99 N.M. 29, 653 P.2d 860 (1982).
- 2. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§66-8-105 to -112 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
3. The court relied upon State v. Wilson, 92 N.M. 54, 582 P.2d 826 (Ct. App. 1978), in which
the results of a blood test, administered against the defendant's will after he refused to cooperate,
were held inadmissible in view of N.M. Stat. Ann. § 64-22-2.11 A (2d Repl. Vol. 1975) (currently
codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-8-111(A) (Cum. Supp. 1983)), which provides that when a person
refuses to submit to a chemical test, "none shall be administered." Interestingly, however, the United
States Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), held that a state could force
a defendant to submit to a blood-alcohol test without violating the defendant's fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination. Thus, the protections afforded under the New Mexico Implied Consent
Act extend further than those of the fifth amendment.
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the statute as investing a driver with a "right" to refuse the test; rather,
the statute merely confers upon a driver the "power" to refuse the test.
This distinction, according to the court, makes admission of the defend-
ant's refusal to cooperate "clearly proper. '
In rejecting the defendant's fifth amendment claim, the court concluded
that the defendant's refusal to submit to the test did not constitute "tes-
timonial evidence," and, accordingly, was not within constitutional pro-
tection. Instead, the court considered the defendant's refusal to be
circumstantial evidence of his consciousness of guilt which, in turn,
supported the inference of alcohol impairment.' Finally, the court refused
to endorse the view adopted by the court of appeals in State v. Chavez6
that a defendant's refusal to submit to an alcohol test "was simply not
relevant evidence" 7 as a matter of law. The court instead held that "a
defendant's refusal to take a chemical test is relevant to show his con-
sciousness of guilt and fear of the test results. "'
Although evidence of consciousness of guilt, as shown by flight from
the scene of a crime9 or by falsification or tampering with evidence, 0 is
well recognized by New Mexico courts as probative of guilt, McKay is
the first decision to hold that refusal to take a chemical test falls within
this particular genre of circumstantial evidence. Other state courts have
been somewhat evenly divided on the relevancy of such evidence. Some
hold the view that the probative value of this evidence outweighs its
prejudicial impact and that it is admissible." Other courts conclude that
the defendant's motivation for refusing the alcohol test may not be pred-
icated on his own consciousness of guilt and the trier of fact should not
4. 99 N.M. at 31, 653 P.2d at 862.
5. Schmerber v. California, supra note 3, left open the question whether admission into evidence
of the defendant's refusal to submit to a test violated his right against self-incrimination. That
question was specifically answered in South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S. Ct. 916 (1983), which was
decided just five months after McKay v. Davis. In Neville, the Supreme Court reasoned that the
fifth amendment prohibits only the use of testimony that is coerced from the defendant (citing Fisher
v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397 (1976)) and that because the state cannot be said to have coerced
the defendant into refusing the test, such refusal is not protected by the privilege against self-
incrimination. 103 S. Ct. at 923.
6. 96 N.M. 313, 629 P.2d 1242 (Ct. App. 1981).
7. Id.
8. McKay, 99 N.M. at 32, 653 P.2d at 863.
9. State v. Beachum, 82 N.M. 204, 207, 477 P.2d 1019, 1022 (1970).
10. See, e.g., State v. Vallejos, 98 N.M. 798, 653 P.2d 174 (Ct. App. 1982); State v. Gonzales,
93 N.M. 445, 601 P.2d 78 (Ct. App. 1979).
11. See Hill v. State, 366 So. 2d 318 (Ala. 1979); People v. Sudduth, 65 Cal. 2d 543, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 393, 421 P.2d 401 (1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850 (1967); People v. Roach, 108 Cal.
App. 3d 891, 166 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1980); State v. Karasinski, 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 342, 214 A.2d 484,
cert. denied, 213 A.2d 526 (Conn. 1965); State v. Durrant, 188 A.2d 526 (Del. 1963); State v.
Bock, 80 Idaho 296, 328 P.2d 1065 (1958); State v. Benson, 230 Iowa 1168, 300 N.W. 275 (1941);
Westerville v. Cunningham, 15 Ohio St. 2d 121, 239 N.E.2d 40 (1968).
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speculate upon the true reason." With McKay, New Mexico joins those
jurisdictions that regard the probative value of the evidence to be greater
than its potential for prejudice. At the same time, however, the court
acknowledged the defendant's right to present evidence that his refusal
was prompted by a reason other than his consciousness of guilt. These
reasons might include the defendant's skepticism about the accuracy of
the test, his mistaken impression that he had a right to refuse the test, or
fear that physical infirmities might interfere with the test results. '3
III. RELEVANCY
In Ohlson v. Kent Nowlin, 4 the New Mexico Supreme Court reaffirmed
that the general rules of relevancy-Rules 40 1, " 402,16 and 403 7 -govern
the admissibility of all evidence at trial. In particular, the court's analysis
emphasized the preeminent role of Rule 403's exclusion of otherwise
relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
Karl Ohlson's wife was killed in a natural gas explosion at their home.
At trial, Ohlson sought to introduce evidence of prior incidents of damage
to gas lines by Kent Nowlin to prove that the negligence of both Kent
Nowlin and the Gas Company of New Mexico damaged the gas line next
to the Ohlson home and caused the fatal explosion. Prior to the explosion
at the Ohlson home, the Gas Company claimed that Kent Nowlin damaged
242 gas lines while working on Albuquerque's South Valley Sewer Proj-
ect.18 Kent Nowlin paid for damages to 166 of these lines. Believing that
Kent Nowlin had admitted fault for these incidents, the trial court allowed
12. See People v. Knutson, 17 I11. App. 2d 251, 149 N.E.2d 461 (1958); State v. McCarthy, 259
Minn. 24, 104 N.W.2d 673 (1960); City of St. Joseph v. Johnson, 539 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. Ct. App.
1976); State v. Paschal, 253 N.C. 795, 117 S.E.2d 749 (1961); Engler v. State, 316 P.2d 625 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1957); State v. Adams, 247 S.E.2d 475 (W. Va. 1978).
13. McKay, 99 N.M. at 32, 653 P.2d at 863 (quoting State v. Jackson, 637 P.2d 1, 6, (Mont.
1981)), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 1418 (1983). See also People v. Contero, 170 Cal. App. 2d Supp.
817, 339 P.2d 968 (1959). The court in Conterno reasoned: "In any case the defendant is entitled
to explain why he declined to take the intoximeter test .... The jury was entitled to weigh his
credibility as to the explanation, as in the case of any other evidence." Id. at 831, 339 P.2d at 977.
14. 99 N.M. 539, 660 P.2d 1021 (Ct. App. 1983).
15. N.M. R. Evid. 401 provides: "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence."
16. N.M. R. Evid. 402 provides: "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by constitution, by statute, by these rules or by other rules adopted by the Supreme Court.
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible."
17. N.M. R. Evid. 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence."
18. Ohlson, 99 N.M. at 541, 660 P.2d at 1023.
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the introduction of these incidents as circumstantial evidence of negli-
gence and as habit evidence under Rule 406. 9
The supreme court held that evidence of the incidents was inadmissible
as offered. The court began its analysis with the definition of relevant
evidence contained in Rule 401 and Rule 402's admonition that evidence
which is not relevant is not admissible.2° Citing Rule 408,21 the court
stated that the fact that Kent Nowlin paid for damage to 166 lines did
not establish liability for those incidents. Moreover, even if that evidence
did establish liability for those 166 incidents, the court held that Kent
Nowlin's negligence in those 166 incidents did not establish the com-
pany's negligence in excavating near the Ohlson home.22 The court further
held that the evidence was inadmissible under Rule 40323 because it would
cause "unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, and mislead the jury. "24
In response to Ohlson's attempt to have the 166 incidents admitted as
habit evidence under Rule 406, the court held that "to argue that Kent
Nowlin had a 'habit' of damaging gas lines is to stretch Evidence Rule
406 far beyond its intended meaning. ", 25 In De La 0 v. Bimbo's Restau-
19. N.M. R. Evid. 406 provides:
(a) Admissibility. Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice
of an organization, whether corroborated or not and regardless of the presence of
eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove that the conduct of the person or organization
on a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or routine practice.
(b) Method of proof. Habit or routine practice may be proved by testimony in
the form of an opinion or by specific instances of conduct sufficient in number
to warrant a finding that the habit existed or that the practice was routine.
20. The Ohlson court also stated: "There is, and can be, no fixed rule delineating relevant and
irrelevant evidence. The problem must be decided on a case-by-case basis." 99 N.M. at 542, 660
P.2d at 1024.
21. N.M. R. Evid. 408 provides:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting
or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or
attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or
amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its
amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is
likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence
otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of compromise
negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered
for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negating a
contention of undue delay or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation
or prosecution.
22. 99 N.M. at 542, 660 P.2d at 1024. In support of this position, the court cited Fullerton v.
Glens Falls Gas & Elec. Light Co., 132 N.Y.S. 995 (N.Y. App. Div. 1911). In Fullerton, the New
York court held that regardless of the negligence of the defendant at other places, its liability in the
case at trial depended upon its negligence only near the plaintiff's property. Therefore, evidence of
other incidents of damage at other places was inadmissible.
23. In State v. Day, 91 N.M. 570, 577 P.2d 878 (Ct. App. 1978), the court of appeals held that
the balancing approach of Rule 403 applies to all forms of evidence: direct and circumstantial,
testimonial, documentary, real proof, and demonstrations.
24. Ohlson, 99 N.M. at 543, 660 P.2d at 1025.
25. Id.
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rant,26 the court of appeals earlier defined habit as "one's regular response
to a repeated specific situation . . [and] the person's regular practice of
meeting a particular kind of situation with a specific type of conduct." 27
Commentators also have characterized habit as "semi-automatic," 2 and
as a mode of behavior that is nearly or completely involuntary. 29 The
supreme court concluded, therefore, that evidence of prior damage to gas
lines could not be properly characterized as habit evidence.
Although Ohlson could not use evidence of other incidents to prove
negligence, under either Rule 406 or under the general relevancy rules,
he could use direct testimony to show that Kent Nowlin "found" gas
lines by using a backhoe, rather than staking out the location of gas lines.
The jury could then draw its own conclusion as to whether Kent Nowlin
was negligent or reckless.
On the issue of admission of these incidents against the Gas Company,3°
the supreme court upheld the trial court's ruling that such evidence could
be introduced to show that the Gas Company received notice of damage
to the lines and, accordingly, had a duty of care. The trial court correctly
ruled that the jury must receive a limiting instruction that evidence of
damage could be used only on the issue of notice to the Gas Company.
IV. PRIVILEGES
A. News Media Privilege
One of the two new rules of evidence adopted by the New Mexico
Supreme Court during 1982-1983 is Rule 514. 3" This rule establishes a
qualified privilege for communications between the news media and con-
fidential sources in both criminal and civil actions. By adopting this rule,
the supreme court revived the newsgatherer's privilege in New Mexico,
a privilege that the Legislature established statutorily on two previous
32
occasions.
In 1967, the Legislature passed a statute granting reporters the privilege
of not disclosing the source of information unless disclosure was essential
to prevent injustice.33 In granting or denying a testimonial privilege to a
26. 89 N.M. 800, 558 P.2d 69 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 7, 558 P.2d 619 (1976).
27. Id. at 804. 558 P.2d at 73 (quoting proposed Fed. R. Evid. 406 advisory committee note).
28. C. McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence, § 195 (Cleary 2d ed. 1972).
29. 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 406[05] (1982 & Supp. 1983).
30. 99 N.M. at 544, 660 P.2d at 1026.
31. N.M. R. Evid. 514, effective November 1, 1982.
32. 1967 N.M. Laws, ch. 168 § I (codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-12.1 (Repl. Pamp. 1970)),
repealed by, 1973 N.M. Laws, ch. 31 § I (codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-12.1 (Supp. 1975)).
33. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-12.1 (1953) (repealed 1973) begins with the statement: "It is hereby
declared to be the public policy of New Mexico that no reporter shall be required to disclose before
any proceeding or by any authority the source of information. .... "
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reporter, the court was to consider the nature of the proceeding, the merits
of the claim or defense, the adequacy of the alternate remedy, the rele-
vancy of the source, and the existence of other sources of the same
information.34 This statute was repealed in 1973. That same year, the
Legislature enacted a lengthier, more comprehensive statute extending
the non-disclosure privilege to journalists, newscasters, or their working
associates.35 The New Mexico Supreme Court, however, struck down the
1973 law in Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc.," holding that
the New Mexico Constitution vested the power to prescribe rules of
evidence in the New Mexico Supreme Court.
Rule 514, which redefines the newsgatherer's privilege, sets out a
general rule as follows:
A person engaged or employed by news media for the purpose of
gathering, procuring, transmitting, compiling, editing or dissemi-
nating news for the general public or on whose behalf news is so
gathered, procured, transmitted, compiled, edited or disseminated
has a privilege to refuse to disclose:
(1) the confidential source from or through whom any information
was procured, obtained, supplied, furnished, gathered, trans-
mitted, compiled, edited, disseminated, or delivered in the course
of pursuing his professional activities; and
(2) any confidential information obtained in the course of pursuing
his professional activities.37
The above provisions do not apply to radio stations unless the station
retains the broadcasted material or a copy of it for 180 days; the required
period for television stations is one year."
After creating a general privilege, the rule establishes the following
exceptions:
There is no privilege under this rule in any action in which the
party seeking the evidence shows by a preponderance of evidence,
including all reasonable inferences, that:
(1) a reasonable probability exists that a news media person has
34. Id. The statute also provided that an order compelling disclosure was appealable and subject
to stay.
35. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-12.1 (Supp. 1975).
36. 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976). The supreme court held that N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-
12.1 (1953) was constitutionally invalid because the Legislature lacks power to prescribe rules of
evidence and procedure. The effect of this decision was to invalidate not only this particular statute,
but all other statutory provisions relating to admissibility of evidence. Although the New Mexico
Supreme Court, by order on April 26, 1973, adopted the New Mexico Rules of Evidence, the
Legislature repealed only scattered statutes regarding evidence in 1973 (1973 N.M. Laws, ch. 223).
37. N.M. R. Evid. 514(b).
38. Id.
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confidential information or sources that are material and relevant
to the action;
(2) the party seeking disclosure has reasonably exhausted alternative
means of discovering the confidential information or sources
sought to be disclosed;
(3) the confidential information or source is crucial to the case of
the party seeking disclosure; and
(4) the need of the party seeking the confidential source or infor-
mation is of such importance that it clearly outweighs the public
interest in protecting the news media's confidential information
and sources.39
In determining whether the newsgatherer's privilege applies, the court
must follow the procedure described in the rule. 4' First, the court must
hold an open hearing to consider all information, evidence, or argument
deemed relevant by the trial court. If possible, the court should make
this determination of relevancy without requiring disclosure of the con-
fidential information. If the court cannot make this determination without
knowing the confidential source of information, then the court may order
in camera disclosure. Following the in camera hearing, the court must
enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law, without disclosing
any of the matters for which the privilege is asserted, and issue a written
order directing whether disclosure shall be made. Any order requiring in
camera disclosure or denying disclosure may be appealed according to
regular appellate procedures.41
Rule 514 modifies the common law rule that a confidential commu-
nication to a journalist is not privileged from disclosure.42 In the absence
of a statute to the contrary, a newsgatherer may be compelled to disclose
confidential information or the identity of a confidential source at a legal
proceeding.43 The United States Supreme Court affirmed this rule in
Branzburg v. Hayes' by holding that the first amendment does not grant
a testimonial privilege to journalists. 45 Branzburg dealt specifically with
grand jury proceedings, but Justice White's opinion left the door open
for states "to fashion their own standards in light of the conditions and
problems with respect to the relations between law enforcement officials
and press in their own areas" and to construe "their own constitutions
so as to recognize a newsman's privilege, either qualified or absolute."
46
39. N.M. R. Evid. 514(c).
40. N.M. R. Evid. 514(d).
41. Id.
42. Annot., 99 A.L.R.3d 37 (1980).
43. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2286 (1961).
44. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
45. Id. at 690.
46. Id. at 706.
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Approximately half the states have adopted "shield laws," which grant
a qualified privilege to the news media in regard to disclosure of news
sources or other information in certain situations.47 Alternatively, some
states, which have not adopted a shield law, have limited the court's right
to cite a journalist for contempt, a policy that leads courts to protect the
newswriter's source whenever possible.48
Although the New Mexico rule of evidence extends a privilege both
to the source and the information, the exceptions are broad.49 Basically,
the party seeking disclosure need only make a showing of need for the
information. Therefore, Rule 514 compels New Mexico courts to take a
case-by-case approach.
In Coronado Credit Union v. KOAT Television, Inc. 5' a case filed
before the adoption of Rule 514, the court of appeals addressed the
question of KOAT-TV's refusal to reveal its sources for allegedly defam-
atory statements. Citing Kutz v. Independent Publishing Co.,51 the court
stated that if a statement fails to contain a full disclosure of facts upon
which an alleged opinion is based, and there are implications in the
statement "'that the writer has private, underlying knowledge to sub-
stantiate his comments about plaintiff,' and such knowledge implies the
existence of defamatory facts, the statement is deemed to be factual and
not privileged." ' 52 Kutz held that a statement of opinion is absolutely
privileged only when the facts upon which the opinion is based are fully
set forth in the published communication.53
Allegations of defamation often are based on statements of opinion.
As a result, the question arises whether Rule 514 overrules Coronado
Credit's statement about the required disclosure of "defamatory facts."
The adoption by the supreme court of this shield rule implies that New
Mexico public policy favors protection for journalists from involuntary
disclosure of information or sources, including "defamatory facts."
B. Waiver of Privileges
In State ex rel. Human Services Department v. Levario, 54 the court of
appeals discussed the waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege es-
47. M. Franklin, Mass Media Law 592 (2d ed. 1982).
48. E. Morgan, Basic Problems of State and Federal Evidence 122 (J. Weinstein 5th ed. 1976).
49. N.M. R. Evid. 514(c).
50. 99 N.M. 233, 656 P.2d 896 (Ct. App. 1982).
51. 97 N.M. 243, 638 P.2d 1088 (Ct. App. 1981).
52. Coronado Credit Union, 99 N.M. at 239, 656 P.2d at 902 (Ct. App. 1981).
53. Kutz, 97 N.M. at 245, 638 P.2d at 1090 (Ct. App. 1981).
54. 98 N.M. 442, 649 P.2d 510 (Ct. App. 1982). During the Survey year the New Mexico Court
of Appeals also addressed the waiver of attorney-client privilege in State v. Ballinger, 99 N.M. 707,
663 P.2d 366 (Ct. App. 1983). The New Mexico Supreme Court determined that the court of appeals
had not complied with its instructions on remand. The supreme court recently reviewed Ballinger
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tablished in Rule 504.15 Levario involved a termination of parental rights
by a state district court. The termination followed the filing of a "neglect
petition" by the New Mexico Department of Human Services (DHS) in
1979. Subsequently, the court ordered the parents and children to be
evaluated by a mental health center with copies of the reports to be given
to the lawyers of the parties. Following an application by DHS for ter-
mination of parental rights two years later, the trial court terminated the
mother's parental rights on the basis of child neglect. At trial, two psy-
chologists testified that the mother had a chronic, inadequate personality
that was unlikely to change." On appeal, the mother contended that the
testimony of the psychologists in regard to her parental ability was priv-
ileged and inadmissible. She relied on Rule 504, which establishes a
psychotherapist-patient privilege. The trial court held that any privilege
was waived because the mother obtained mental health counseling pur-
suant to a stipulation in the neglect proceeding and because the psy-
chologist had furnished reports to all parties.
As background for its decision that no privilege existed for the mother's
communications to the psychologists, the court of appeals analyzed Rule
504 and its application . The court emphasized that the psychotherapist-
patient privilege exists only for confidential communications. For a com-
munication to be confidential, two conditions must be met. First, the
patient must intend that the communication be undisclosed. Second, non-
disclosure must further the interest of the patient. A communication in-
cludes: "(1) verbal communication of patient to psychotherapist; (2) in-
formation or knowledge gained by observation and personal examination
of the patient; (3) inferences and conclusions drawn therefrom; and (4)
exhibiting the body or any part thereof to the psychologist for an opinion,
examination or diagnosis." 58 For a communication to be confidential, the
patient must communicate the desire for non-disclosure to the psycho-
therapist.
and requested that the court of appeals withdraw this opinion. State v. Ballinger, 23 N.M. St. B.
Bull. 109, 11 (Feb. 2, 1984). The case was remanded to the trial court and the scope of inquiry
was expressly limited to "those conversations ... [defendant] had with his first attorney ...
regarding what turning state's evidence meant, and . . .[defendant's] understanding of that expla-
nation." Id.
55. N.M. R. Evid. 504 provides, in pertinent part:
(b) General rule of privilege. A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and
to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications, made
for the purposes of diagnosis or treatment of his mental or emotional condition,
including drug addiction, among himself, his psychotherapist, or persons who
are participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the psycho-
therapist, including members of the patient's family.
56. Levario, 98 N.M. at 446, 649 P.2d at 514.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 446-47, 649 P.2d at 514-15 (citing Williams v. City of Gallup, 77 N.M. 286, 421 P.2d
804 (1966)).
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Relying on Evidence Rule 504(d)(3), 59 the Levario court specifically
held that no privilege exists for communications relevant to an issue of
the mental or emotional condition of any patient in any proceeding in
which he relies upon this condition as an element of the claim or defense. 60
The psychological condition of the mother was an essential factor in
determining whether her parental rights should be terminated; therefore,
the court concluded that she could not rely on her mental condition in
opposing the termination and, at the same time, suppress evidence rel-
evant to that mental condition.
The court noted that the only circumstance under which a psycho-
therapist-patient privilege would arise in a similar situation would be if
DHS induced the mother to be counseled by psychologists under the guise
of assisting her with her mental and emotional problems and she would
not otherwise have sought counseling. 6 In that situation, the DHS would
be estopped from using the psychologist's testimony in the termination
proceeding.62 The court found that the DHS could use the psychological
testimony because the mother in Levario presented no evidence of in-
ducement by DHS or any detrimental reliance on representations by DHS.
V. SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
A. Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence
In 1963, New Mexico became one of the first states to enact a licensing
and regulation scheme relating to polygraphs.63 The present "Polygraphy
59. N.M. R. Evid. 504(d)(3) provides that there is:
no ... privilege under this rule as to communications relevant to an issue of the
mental or emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in which he relies
upon the condition as an element of his claim or defense, or, after the patient's
death, in any proceeding in which any party relies upon the condition as an
element of his claim or defense.
60. Id.
61. 98 N.M. at 447, 649 P.2d at 515. N.M. R. Evid. 504(d)(2) provides that if a judge orders
an examination of the mental or emotional condition of the patient, communications made in the
course thereof are not privileged with respect to the particular purpose for which the examination
is ordered unless the judge orders otherwise. In this case, the Department of Human Services, not
the court, requested the examinations and counseling. Therefore, 504(d)(2) did not apply. The court
explicitly stated, however, the circumstances under which DHS would be estopped from using the
psychotherapist's testimony.
62. 98 N.M. at 447, 649 P.2d at 515.
63. 1963 N.M. Laws, ch. 225 §§ 1-14 (codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. §§67-31-1 to -14 (1953)),
repealed by, 1973 N.M. Laws, ch. 28 § 12 (codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 67-31-A-1 to -11 (1953))(current version at N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 61-26-1 to -13 (1978)). In that same year Illinois (I11. Rev.
Stat. ch. 38 §202.1 through 202.30 (1963 IIl. Laws p. 3300)) and Kentucky (Ky. Rev. Stat.§§ 329.010 to -.990 (1962 Ky. Acts, ch. 78)) also passed legislation relating to licensure and regulation
of polygraph operators. For a current listing of state statutory provisions regarding licensure of
polygraph examiners see Comment: Regulation of Polygraph Testing in the Employment Context:
Suggested Statutory Control on Test Use and Examiner Competence, 15 U.C.D. L. Rev. 113, 115
n.11 (1981).
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Act"'  establishes minimum qualifications for licensure of polygraphers.65
It does not, however, purport to be a rule of evidence governing the
admissibility of polygraph evidence at trial.'
In 1975, the New Mexico Supreme Court in State v. Dorsey67 estab-
lished guidelines for the admission of polygraph test results at trial. 68 The
court ruled that such evidence is admissible if the expertise of the po-
lygraph operator is established by his qualifications;69 if testimony estab-
lishes the reliability of the testing procedure employed as approved by
authorities in the field; and if the validity of the tests made on the subject
is established.70 The court specifically eliminated the requirements that
the parties stipulate to the admissibility of the polygraph results and that
no objection to admissibility be made by the opponent at trial. 7 The
decision, however, did not set minimum qualifications for polygraph
operators, nor did it identify specific criteria for determining the efficacy
of the testing procedure either generally or on the test subject.72
64. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§61-26-1 to -13 (Repl. Pamp. 1983).
65. The statute provides:
To be eligible for licensure as a polygrapher, a person shall:
A. have obtained the age of majority;
B. be a citizen of the United States;
C. be of good moral character, and either:
(1) successfully pass an examination or another test of the ability to practice
polygraphy as prescribed by regulation; or
(2) submit proof of holding, for at least two years immediately prior to the
date of application, a current license to practice polygraphy in another
jurisdiction whose standards equal or surpass those of New Mexico.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 61-26-7 (Repl. Pamp. 1983).
The 1978 Act abolished the Polygraph Board, which had been created by the 1963 Act and
continued in existence under the 1973 Act. Under present law the statute is administered by the
Attorney General through such advisory committees as he or she may appoint. N.M. Stat. Ann.
§61-26-5 (Repl. Pamp. 1983).
66. Polygraph evidence may, under appropriate circumstances, be admissible at trial either as
substantive evidence or as relevant to the credibility of a witness. See, e.g., State v. Dorsey, 88
N.M. 184, 539 P.2d 204 (1975) and State v. Alderette, 86 N.M. 176, 521 P.2d 138 (Ct. App. 1974),
overruled in part, State v. Lucero, 86 N.M. 686, 526 P.2d 1091 (1974). It is most commonly used,
however, in employment screening situations.
67. 88 N.M. 184, 539 P.2d 204 (1975).
68. See Romero, The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence Under the New Mexico and Federal
Rules of Evidence, 6 N.M. L. Rev. 187 (1976).
69. The court mentions no criteria for evaluation of qualifications. Apparently, the court has the
discretion to qualify an operator as an expert. State v. Dorsey, 88 N.M. 184, 539 P.2d 204 (1975).
70. Id. at 185, 539 P.2d at 205.
71. Dorsey overruled State v. Lucero, 86 N.M. 686, 526 P.2d 1091 (1974), which had required,
in addition to the three criteria recognized in Dorsey, both a stipulation and absence of objection at
trial to permit receipt of polygraph evidence. Therefore, after Dorsey, New Mexico became the first
state to permit explicitly the introduction of polygraph evidence without a stipulation.
72. Northwestern University law professor Fred Inbau, perhaps the law profession's leading
proponent of polygraph evidence, has long advocated the establishment of minimum qualifications
for polygraph operators. See, e.g., Use of Polygraphs as 'Lie Detectors' by the Federal Government:
Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Governmental Operations, 88th Cong., 2d
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On April 20, 1983, the New Mexico Supreme Court adopted Rule 707
of the New Mexico Rules of Evidence relating to polygraph evidence.7 3
The new rule establishes specific foundational prerequisites for the in-
court testimony of a polygraph examiner called as an expert witness. 74
First, the examiner must be qualified as an expert. The proponent must
show that the operator has at least five years experience in the field; that
the examination complied with the procedural requirements of the rule;
and that the operator recently completed at least twenty hours of contin-
uing education in the field of polygraph.75 Second, the test itself must be
administered pursuant to several enumerated conditions. Specifically, the
test must be conducted in compliance with all provisions of the rule;76 it
must be quantitatively secured in a manner that is generally accepted as
reliable by polygraph experts; 77 the polygraph examiner must be familiar
with the subject's background, health, education, and other relevant in-
formation;78 at least two relevant questions must be asked during the
examination;79 and at least three charts must be taken of the examinee."0
Rule 707 also conditions the admissibility of polygraph results upon
compliance with specific procedural requirements. The proponent must
Sess. (1964), (testimony of Fred Inbau); Inbau and Reid, The Lie-Detector Technique: A Reliable
and Valuable Investigative Aid, 50 A.B.A. J. 470, 471 (1964); A. Moenssens, R. Moses, and F.
Inbau, Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases 541 (1973). Professor Inbau would require the polygraph
operator to be a person of intelligence, with a good educational background-preferably a college
degree-and possessed of a personality capable of getting along with people. He should also have
received individualized training of at least six months in the examination and interpretation of
polygraph records under the guidance of an experienced examiner with an extensive clinical practice.
The training should also include instruction in the pertinent aspects of psychology and physiology.
73. The rule became effective June 1, 1983.
74. Unlike the general guidelines established in Dorsey, Rule 707(b) sets out the minimum
qualifications that must be proved before the polygraph examiner may be qualified as an expert and
permitted to express his opinion upon a person's trustworthiness.
75. N.M. R. Evid. 707(b)(1). Section (b)(l) also requires that to be qualified as an expert, a
polygraph examiner must have conducted or reviewed the polygraph examination in accordance with
the rule; Rule 707(c) sets out the requirements for the examination.
76. For example, the examiner must be qualified as specified in 707(b); appropriate notices given
as provided in 707(d); and a pre-test interview recorded as provided in 707(e).
77. The objective scoring system requirement apparently operates as a safeguard against the
abusive practice of utilizing the polygraph test as an "interrogation prop," that is, as a pretext for
the examiner's open-ended inquiries designed simply to extract information from the test subject.
Professor Inbau regards such non-objective or non-quantifiable questioning as an improper polygraph
technique. He stated that "you actually don't need to invest in a polygraph, you can use a mimeograph
machine for the same purpose. [Such techniques are] used by some people as a psychologist gimmick
for interrogation purposes only, not for a determination of truth and deception." A. Moenssens, R.
Moses, and F. lnbau, supra note 72, at 96.
78. See J. Reid & F. Inbau, Truth and Deception 10 (1966).
79. "Relevant question" is defined by N.M. R. Evid. 707(a)(4) as "a clear and concise question
which refers to specific objective facts directly related to the purpose of the examination and does
not allow rationalization in the answer."
80. A chart, according to N.M. R. Evid. 707(a)(1), is a "record of bodily reactions by a polygraph
instrument that is attached to the human body during a series of questions."
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serve notice of his intention to present such evidence upon the opposing
party at least ten days before trial. The notice must include a copy of the
examiner's report; a copy of each chart; a copy of the audio or video
recording of the pre-test interview, 81 the test itself, and any post-test
interview; and a list of any prior polygraph examinations taken by the
subject in the same matter.
The rule is designed to tighten the loose standard of admissibility for
polygraph evidence established under Dorsey. The rule creates standards
for determining the qualifications of proffered experts in the field of lie
detection. Moreover, the rule seeks to eliminate the element of surprise
in the use of polygraph evidence by requiring full pre-trial disclosure of
the intention to offer such testimony. Critics of the rule will argue that
determinations of admissibility of scientific opinion testimony should be
made in each case on the basis of the foundational evidence presented
rather than pursuant to some codified standard.82 A particular polygraph
operator who does not meet the requirements of the rule may nevertheless
be able to present evidence that is relevant to a determination of a person's
credibility; conversely, compliance with those requirements does not nec-
essarily ensure the reliability of the evidence. Moreover, the wisdom of
freezing standards of admissibility into immutable positive law, i.e., a
rule of evidence, may be questioned by those who see the flexible standard
of relevancy embodied in Rule 403 undermined, at least to some extent,
by Rule 707.83
B. The Psychological Stress Evaluator
Although New Mexico courts forged ahead of most others in permitting
the introduction of polygraph evidence," the court of appeals recently
made it clear that its tolerance of scientific techniques for evaluating
credibility is not boundless. In Simon Neustadt Family Center, Inc. v.
Bludworth,85 the court ruled that the trial judge properly excluded evidence
of the results of a Psychological Stress Evaluation (the "PSE"). 6
The PSE supposedly enables a trained operator to detect deception by
recording minute variations in a subject's voice modulation. The PSE is
81. N.M. R. Evid. 707(e) provides: "The pre-test interview and actual testing shall be recorded
in full on an audio or video recording device."
82. For a discussion of the general scientific acceptance standard and foundation evidence as
prerequisites for admissibility of polygraphic evidence, see Romero, supra note 68, at 206-211.
83. Comment, The Polygraph and Evidence Rule Making-A Proposal for Restraint in Ohio, 3
N. Ky. L. Rev. 214, 227 (1976).
84. See supra notes 63-83 and accompanying text.
85. 97 N.M. 500, 641 P.2d 531 (Ct. App. 1982).
86. For a more complete discussion of the PSE, see Note, Lie-Detector Evidence, New Mexico
Court ofAppeals Holds Voice-Stress Lie-Detector Evidence Conditionally Admissible: Simon Neustadt
Family Center, Inc. v. Bludworth, 13 N.M.L. Rev. 703 (1983).
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similar to the polygraph in that both operate from the premise that a
person will manifest involuntary physiological changes when engaging
in deception. Unlike the polygraph, however, the PSE test subject is not
physically connected to the monitoring device. Rather, the PSE monitors
vocal responses from a tape recording of the subject's voice.87 Thus, the
test is said to eliminate the apprehension factor from the evaluation, and
this in turn enhances its reliability."8
The court in Bludworth applied the criteria established by the New
Mexico Supreme Court in State v. Dorsey9 to determine whether the trialjudge abused his discretion in refusing to admit the PSE evidence. First,
the court determined that the PSE operator's qualifications as an expert
were not established. The opinion recognized that, like the polygraph,
the accuracy of the PSE results is dependent in large measure upon the
qualifications of the operator. In this case, the operator had four years'
experience in administering PSE tests, three weeks' training by the man-
ufacturer of the device, and six months' training under another operator.
He was not a licensed polygrapher, however, and had no training in
physiology or medicine. Moreover, he acknowledged that he was unable
to determine whether a person was psychologically fit to take the test. 90
Under these facts, the court held that the trial judge was justified in
finding the witness to be insufficiently qualified to testify as an expert on
PSE results.
Second, the court went on to discuss the scientific reliability of the
PSE technique. Although researchers, courts, and commentators disagree
on the efficacy of this innovative device, the court said that "a diversity
of opinion . . . regarding the effectiveness of a scientific procedure does
not call for a per se rule of inadmissibility. "' The court declined to hold
that PSE evidence is inadmissible as a matter of law. Instead, the court
determined that the proponent has the burden of persuading the court of
the reliability of the device, presumably by presenting expert testimony
on the subject.
87. The polygraph monitors blood pressure, breathing, and galvanic skin response (i.e., per-
spiration) during the test subject's interrogation by an examiner. For a discussion of the PSE see
Kenety, The Psychological Stress Evaluator: The Theory, Validity and Legal Status of an Innovative
"Lie Detector," 55 Ind. L.J. 349, 355 (1980).
88. Kenety, supra note 87, at 356.
89. 88 N.M. 184, 539 P.2d 204 (1975). See supra text accompanying notes 67-72.
90. Bludworth, 97 N.M. 500, 641 P.2d 531 (Ct. App. 1982).
91. 97 N.M. at 505, 641 P.2d at 536. The opinion cites two studies, M. Kradz, The Psychological
Stress Evaluator: A Study (1972), reprinted in Hearings on the Use of Polygraphs and Similar
Devices by Federal Agencies Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government
Information of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15, 225,
435-36 (1974) and J. Worth & B. Lewis, An Early Validation Study with the Psychological Stress
Evaluator (PSE) (1972), which disagree on the efficacy of the technique; and two state cases, Smith
v. State, 31 Md. App. 106, 355 A.2d 527 (1976) and State v. Schouest, 351 So. 2d 462 (La. 1977),
which reject PSE evidence to demonstrate the professional controversy surrounding the technique.
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Third, the proponent must demonstrate the fitness of the subject to take
the test and the test's validity for the subject. The court suggested that
the subject's psychological frame of mind, including his state of sobriety
and any extrinsic tensions might be relevant factors. 92 Moreover, re-
sponses indicating possible deception should be tested further to determine
whether they might be the result of extraneous factors rather than con-
scious deception.
Although Bludworth stops considerably short of sanctioning the use of
PSE evidence at trial, it holds the door open for its admission where an
appropriate foundation can be established pursuant to the Dorsey guide-
lines. Moreover, it would not appear that the more stringent rules now
applicable to polygraph evidence in New Mexico93 apply to the PSE.
Rule 707 applies by its own terms to "polygraph examinations" '94 rather
than to devices purporting to be lie detectors generally. An anomalous
situation exists in New Mexico in which polygraph evidence, just recently
beginning to gain courtroom acceptability, is subject to stringent and rigid
foundational prerequisites, whereas PSE evidence, about which little has
been written and which has been virtually ignored by the courts, may be
admitted under the more general and flexible Dorsey criteria.
VI. HEARSAY
A. Dying Declarations
Rule 804(b)(3) permits the introduction of a "statement made by a
declarant while believing that his death was imminent, concerning the
cause or circumstances of what he believed to be his impending death." 95
The rule sanctions the dying declaration, described by McCormick as
"the most mystical in its theory" of all exceptions to the hearsay rule.96
92. 97 N.M. at 506, 641 P.2d at 537 (Ct. App. 1982).
93. See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of N.M. R. Evid. 707.
94. A polygraph examination is defined by Rule 707(a)(2) as "a test using a polygraph instrument
which at a minimum simultaneously graphically records on a chart the physiological changes in
human respiration, cardiovascular activity, galvanic skin resistance or reflex for the purpose of lie
detection."
95. N.M. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) is derived from Fed. R. Evid 804(b)(2) and is identical to it except
that the federal rule applies only to homicide and civil cases; the New Mexico rule applies to all
criminal and civil cases.
96. C. McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 281 (Cleary 2d ed. 1972). The original
religious underpinnings of the exception (e.g., no one "who is immediately going into the presence
of his Maker will do so with a lie on his lips" Reg. v. Osman, 15 Cox C.C. 1, 3 (Eng. 1881)) have,
in large measure, been displaced by more secular notions of the trustworthiness of such statements.
See, e.g., People v. Calahan, 42 Il. App. 3d 994, 356 N.E.2d 942, 945 (1976): "At the moment
wherein the deceased realizes his own death is imminent there can no longer be any temporal self-
serving purpose to be furthered regardless of the speaker's personal religious beliefs." See also,
Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) advisory committee note: "While the original religious justification for the
exception may have lost its conviction for some persons over the years, it can scarcely be doubted
that powerful psychological pressures are present."
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State v. Quintana97 presented the supreme court with its first opportunity
to interpret the codification of the dying declaration exception to the
hearsay rule in the New Mexico Rules of Evidence.98 The defendant, a
peace officer, was charged with a shooting death. The victim died in the
hospital five days after the shooting. In the interim, the victim's family
engaged a lawyer to explore the prospects for a civil suit for injuries
arising from the incident. The attorney visited the victim in the hospital
and obtained a statement, which the prosecutor later placed in evidence
as a dying declaration." The defendant challenged the voluntary man-
slaughter conviction on the ground that the prosecution failed to lay an
adequate foundation for the admission of the dying declaration. Specif-
ically, the defense argued that the evidence adduced at trial did not es-
tablish that the victim believed his death to be imminent when he made
his statement to the family lawyer. The court of appeals agreed, reversed
the conviction, and remanded the case for retrial. On certiorari, the su-
preme court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the conviction.
In upholding the admission of Lopez' declaration, the supreme court
addressed two separate aspects of the conditions under which dying dec-
larations are to be admitted: (1) the manner of proving the declarant's
state of mind at the time the statement is made; and (2) the extent to
which the declarant's resignation to the inevitability of his death must be
established.
1. Proving The Declarant's State of Mind
Deathbed utterances derive their special guarantee of trustworthiness
from the solemnity of the occasion," a situation of which the declarant
must be aware. The declarant's awareness of his approaching death is
ordinarily shown by circumstantial evidence. Evidence that the declarant
said something to the effect that, "I don't think I'm going to make it,'' °
97. 98 N.M. 17, 644 P.2d 531 (1982).
98. There exists scant authority in the reported New Mexico cases regarding the admissibility of
dying declarations under the common law. Territory v. Eagle, 15 N.M. 609, 110 P. 862 (1910),
apparently first recognized this exception to the hearsay rule. The court simply asserted that "The
general rules governing the admissibility of dying declarations are too well established to need any
lengthy discussion." Id. at 614, 110 P. at 863.
99. The State sought admission of several hearsay statements by the victim at trial including:
"Lopez told the attorney that he and other persons were sitting around [a bonfire]. Shots were fired
which took Lopez by complete surprise. He then tried to get into a nearby car for safety when he
was struck by a bullet. He stated that he did not have a firearm with him. Also, he stated that to
the best of his knowledge no one else in his group ever fired at anyone." 98 N.M. at 19, 644 P.2d
at 533, n.3.
100. See 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1438 (Chadbourn Rev. 1974): "All
courts have agreed, with more or less difference of language, that the approach of death produces
a state of mind in which the utterances of the dying person are to be taken as free from all ordinary
motives to misstate" (emphasis in original).
101. See People v. Bagwell, 38 Cal. App. 3d 127, 113 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1974); State v. Morran,
131 Mont. 17, 306 P.2d 679 (1956); State v. Garcia, 99 N.M. 771, 664 P.2d 969 (1983).
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or "Will you see after my wife and baby?"' 02 would permit the inference
that he was aware of his hopeless condition. '03 Evidence that the victim's
doctor told him there was no hope,"° or that the victim asked for or was
administered the last rites,'0 5 may serve the same purpose. In Quintana,
however, the state sought to prove the victim's consciousness of imminent
death through the testimony of the family's lawyer who had spoken to
him in the hospital shortly before he died. The victim was connected to
a number of machines monitoring his vital functions; his breathing was
labored; he had difficulty speaking, and he was bleeding from the nose
and mouth. He told the attorney that he knew he was seriously hurt, that
his back was broken, that he was paralyzed, and that "he knew that there
was a strong possibility of dying. "'06 The court concluded that the nature
of the wounds themselves was sufficient to support the inference that the
victim believed he was dying.107
2. The Victim's Resignation to Inevitable Death
The foundational testimony adduced in Quintana suggests that although
the victim "knew there was a strong possibility of dying," he was not
necessarily resigned to such a fate."°8 If the trustworthiness of a dying
declaration is predicated upon the solemn occasion of death's certain
arrival, then the victim must entertain more than an apprehension of
death."° In Shepard v. United States,"o Justice Cardozo described cer-
102. Ledbetter v. State, 34 Ala. App. 35, 36, 36 So. 2d 564, 568 (1948).
103. The victim's out-of-court statement about his own poor prospects for recovery raise a hearsay
problem apart from that of his comments about the cause or circumstances of his death. On the one
hand, the proponent of the statement may argue that the statement indicating a belief in the approach
of death is not hearsay, i.e., not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but rather is itself
circumstantial evidence of the declarant's state of mind. On the other hand, the proponent may argue
that while the statement is indeed offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, it falls within
the hearsay exception for then-existing mental, emotional, or physical condition (known familiarly
as the "state of mind" exception to the hearsay rule), N.M. R. Evid 803(3). In either case, the
statement would be admissible to prove the declarant's state of mind. For a discussion of the hearsay
versus non-hearsay approaches to proof of state of mind, see 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at
Common Law § 1715 (Chadboum Rev. 1974); 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence
§ 803(3)[02] (1981); Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae,
31 Yale L.J. 229, 232 (1922).
104. State v. Stewart, 30 N.M. 227, 233, 231 P. 692, 695 (1924).
105. Carver v. United States, 164 U.S. 694, 695-96 (1897); People v. Tilley, 406 Ill. 398, 94
N.E.2d 328 (1950); Commonwealth v. Peyton, 360 Pa. 441, 62 A.2d 37 (1948).
106. 98 N.M. at 19, 644 P.2d at 533.
107. This ruling is in accord with settled law in New Mexico. Territory v. Eagle, 15 N.M. 609,
619, 110 P.2d 862, 865 (1910); State v. Stewart, 30 N.M. 227, 239, 231 P. 692, 695 (1924); 5 J.
Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1442 (Chadbourn Rev. 1974).
108. Quintana, 98 N.M. at 19, 644 P.2d at 533.
109. "It follows from the general principle that the belief must be, not merely of the possibility
of death, nor even of its probability, but of its certainty." 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at
Common Law § 1440 (Chadboum Rev. 1974) (emphasis in original).
110. 290 U.S. 96 (1933).
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tainty of an inevitable end as an indispensable precondition to the ad-
mission of a dying declaration as follows:
Fear or even belief that illness will end in death will not avail of
itself to make a dying declaration. There must be "a settled hopeless
expectation" . . . that death is near at hand, and what is said must
have been spoken in the hush of its impending presence. . . .The
patient must have spoken with the consciousness of a swift and certain
doom."'
Therefore, traditional doctrine requires the declarant's positive and ab-
solute belief that death is certain. "2 Similarly, New Mexico cases also
require a belief "that imminent death is inevitable" '' and that the de-
clarant speak "without hope of recovery."1 4
In Quintana, the supreme court purposefully retreated from the strin-
gent common law foundational requirements and adopted what it per-
ceived to be a looser standard established by the Federal and New Mexico
Rules of Evidence: "The only requirement is that the statement be made
by a declarant while believing that his death was imminent."".. Although
the distinction between an abandonment of hope and a belief that death
is imminent is not readily apparent, the court concluded that recent
achievements of medical science (and presumably their attendant public-
ity) may serve to rekindle flickering hopes for recovery, making it rare
to find a deathbed victim who has given up all hope." 6
Quintana, therefore, sets a new standard for the introduction of dying
declaration in New Mexico: the solemnity of the occasion sufficient to
guarantee trustworthiness must be established by a showing that the victim
had a reasonable belief that his imminent death was more likely than his
survival.
B. Statement of Recent Perception
In State v. Barela, "' the court of appeals addressed the limitations of
admissibility under New Mexico's hearsay exception for statements of
111. Id. at 100.
112. Wigmore, supra note 109. See also Hoskins v. State, 268 Ind. 290, 375 N.E.2d 191 (1978)
(declarant must have "given up hope for recovery"); Peak v. State, 50 N.J.L. 179, 222, 12 A. 701,
706 (1888) ("Death ... must be an absolute certainty .... ")
113. State v. Stewart, 30 N.M. 227, 233, 231 P. 692, 695 (1924) (emphasis added).
114. In State v. Sanford, 44 N.M. 66, 81, 97 P.2d 915, 924 (1939) the New Mexico Supreme
Court quoted at length from Shepard and specifically adopted the strict standard that a "settled
hopeless expectation" of death must be exhibited in the evidence before a dying declaration may be
received.
115. 98 N.M. at 20, 644 P.2d at 534.
116. The court cited Johnson v. State, 579 P.2d 20 (Alaska 1978) and Shuman v. State, 94 Nev.
265, 578 P.2d 1183 (1978) as support for the new doctrine that awareness of the probability (rather
than certainty) of death will support the introduction of a dying declaration in New Mexico.
117. 97 N.M. 723, 643 P.2d 287 (Ct. App. 1982).
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recent perception.118 The defendant was charged with the aggravated
battery of a person who later died.' 19 Two days before his death, the
victim was interviewed by a police detective who showed him a photo
array. The victim identified the defendant as his attacker. The court later
permitted the prosecution to offer evidence that the victim, then unavail-
able to testify, had identified the defendant.
The defendant challenged his conviction on the ground that the trial
court improperly interpreted the scope of the hearsay exception for state-
ments of recent perception. The court acknowledged that it had approved
this hearsay exception for use in criminal cases in State v. Maestas2° but
distinguished that case on its particular facts. In Maestas, the victim
voluntarily made statements identifying her attacker to family members
and a nurse at the hospital while she was recovering from a beating. 21
In Barela, on the other hand, the victim's statements were prompted by
an investigating police officer. Rule 804(b)(2) permits the use of state-
ments of recent perception only where the statement is "not in response
to the instigation of a person engaged in investigating, litigating or settling
a claim . . 122 The court found that trustworthiness of the statement
was tainted and it was inadmissible in view of its marginal reliability
under any circumstances. 123
C. Hearsay and the Confrontation Clause
The relationship between the rules of evidence governing the admission
of hearsay and the federal right of confrontation embodied in the sixth
118. N.M. R. Evid. 804(b)(2). This hearsay exception, initially proposed in the United States
Supreme Court draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence (56 F.R.D. 183 (1972)), was adopted verbatim
by the New Mexico Supreme Court in April, 1973, before the Federal Rules actually became effective.
The final version of the Federal Rules of Evidence enacted by Congress (Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub.
L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926) rejected the hearsay exception for statements of recent perception.
The Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary states:
The Committee eliminated this Rule as creating a new and unwarranted ex-
ception of great potential breadth. The Committee did not believe that statements
of the type referred to bore sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to justify
admissibility.
H.R. Rep. No. 650, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
7075, 7079-80.
119. The defendant was not charged with homicide because the connection between the attack
and the victim's death was apparently speculative. 97 N.M. 723, 725, 643 P.2d 287, 289 (1982).
120. 92 N.M. 135, 584 P.2d 182 (Ct. App. 1978). The New Mexico Supreme Court appears also
to have approved application of the rule in State v. Robinson, 94 N.M. 693, 616 P.2d 406 (1980).
See Norwood, Evidence, 12 N.M. L. Rev. 379, 399-400 (1982).
121. 92 N.M. 135, 139, 584 P.2d 182, 186 (Ct. App. 1978).
122. N.M. R. Evid. 804(b)(2).
123. The opinion goes on to hold the victim's statement inadmissible under the so-called "catch-
all" provisions, N.M. R. Evid. 803(24) and 804(b)(6), on the grounds that statements of identification
lack sufficient evidence of reliability to qualify as hearsay exceptions. In support of this proposition,
the court notes that out-of-court statements of identification are admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(C)
only where the declarant (the person who made the out-of-court identification) is a witness at the
trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the identification.
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amendment historically has been an uneasy one. 2 4 In a criminal case,' 25
the proffer of hearsay evidence by the prosecution is bound to elicit an
automatic objection by the defendant that the introduction of such evi-
dence denies him the opportunity to confront the witness against him.
Although a literal reading of the sixth amendment'26 might suggest that
the only source of admissible evidence in the prosecution's case should
be from witnesses produced in the courtroom, the courts have resisted
the temptation to read evidentiary hearsay rules as congruent with the
confrontation clause.'27 For example, the United States Supreme Court
sanctioned the admission of dying declarations, 28 statements of co-con-
spirators,' 129 and former reported testimony 3 ° in the face of sixth amend-
ment challenges.
Although the courts, on a piecemeal basis, attempted to reconcile the
hearsay rules with the confrontation clause, 3' no unified theory of ad-
missibility emerged until the United States Supreme Court's 1980 decision
in Ohio v. Roberts'3 2 in which the relationship between hearsay and
confrontation was expressed more definitively. The Court stated:
[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination
at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that
he is unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it
bears adequate "indicia of reliability." Reliability can be inferred
without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded,
at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustwor-
thiness. 1"3
124. See, e.g., Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence
for Criminal Cases, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 567 (1978); Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the
Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 Crim. L. Bull. 99 (1972); Comment, Federal
Confrontation: A Not Very Clear Say on Hearsay, 13 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 366 (1966).
125. By its own terms, the confrontation clause is applicable only to criminal cases.
126. The sixth amendment's confrontation clause provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him... "
127. An obvious source of difficulty in considering the two concepts to be coextensive is the fact
that state hearsay rules vary widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
128. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
129. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
130. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
131. Reported opinions tend simply to reiterate the broad proposition that the hearsay rule and
the confrontation clause are not co-extensive and, from this premise, go on to determine the reliability
of the hearsay evidence then under review for purposes of admissibility. Typical of such analysis is
California v. Green, in which the Court said, "[w]hile it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules
and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values, it is quite a different
thing to suggest that the overlap is complete and that the Confrontation Clause is nothing more or
less than a codification of the rules of hearsay and their exceptions as they existed historically at
common law." 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970).
132. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
133. Id. at 66.
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Under this analysis, the prosecution's offer of hearsay evidence should
be predicated upon its inability to produce live, in-court testimony. 1
3 4
State v. Martinez.35 represents the first occasion in which a New Mexico
appellate court relied upon the doctrine established in Ohio v. Roberts.
In Martinez, the prosecution offered into evidence the out-of-court dec-
laration of an armed robbery victim who, while fleeing from her assailant,
ran up to a police officer and, in a state of obvious distress and excitement,
identified the defendant as the robber. The prosecution did not call the
victim as a witness at trial, but her statement was offered in evidence as
an excited utterance' 36 through the police officer.
Although the hearsay exception for excited utterances is not conditioned
upon the unavailability of the declarant, 37 the court of appeals in Martinez
held that Ohio v. Roberts imposes such a requirement. In Martinez, the
prosecution did not explain the victim's unavailability. The court ruled
that "the state failed to satisfactorily demonstrate due diligence . . ."
in attempting to bring the witness to court. Moreover, "[M]ere absence
of a witness from the jurisdiction is not sufficient grounds for dispensing
with defendant's right of confrontation."' 39 The state must make a good
faith effort to secure the presence of witnesses before their out-of-court
declarations will be admitted to prove the truth of the matters asserted.
Nor will technical unavailability suffice. The prosecution must make a
good faith effort to secure the presence of the witness at trial even though
it may lack the power to compel such attendance."
134. Both the New Mexico and Federal Rules of Evidence divide the hearsay exceptions into
two broad categories: those in which the availability of the declarant is immaterial (Rule 803) and
those in which the unavailability of the declarant must be established (Rule 804). The former category
of exceptions embodies those declarations traditionally viewed as possessing a high degree of
reliability and hence admissible despite little need for resort to hearsay. The latter category embodies
those declarations that are less reliable and hence admissible only where greater need for the evidence
is shown. McCormick characterizes the Rule 804 exceptions as "second class" hearsay. C. Mc-
Cormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 253 (Cleary 2d ed. 1972). Although it might appear
simplest to treat all hearsay offered by the state in a criminal case as falling within the Rule 804
rubric, the definitions of "unavailability" adopted by the Rules of Evidence and by the courts for
confrontation purposes have not always been identical. Compare Rule 804(a) with Barber v. Page,
390 U.S. 719 (1968).
135. 99 N.M. 48, 653 P.2d 879 (Ct. App. 1982).
136. N.M. R. Evid 803(2).
137. See supra note 134.
138. 99 N.M. at 52, 653 P.2d at 883.
139. Id.
140. See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), in which the Court held that a witness who was
a federal prisoner in another state was not "unavailable" for confrontation purposes. The Court
pointed specifically to the fact that the state made "absolutely no effort" to have the prisoner present
for the trial. Id. at 723. On the other hand, in Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 212 (1972), the
Court found that a declarant living outside the United States was unavailable notwithstanding a lack
of effort by the state to procure his attendance by informal means. Thus, the extent to which the
state must attempt to bring a witness to court is still unclear, and a subjective standard of "reason-
ableness" appears to be the only guide.
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